ASEAN countries have traditionally maintained their autonomy under the banner of "centrality," avoiding excessive dependence on any single external power through an omnidirectional strategy. This approach involves expanding cooperation with as many extra-regional partners as possible in trade, investment, and infrastructure development to sustain their autonomy.
The most critical challenge is balancing engagement with the United States and China. The US remains the world's preeminent military power and central to the global financial regime, and is the largest source of investment and export market for many ASEAN states. However, the second Trump administration's unpredictable foreign policy is eroding American soft power, while China intensifies outreach to the Global South, deepening cooperative relationships with ASEAN.
Beijing presents its relationship with ASEAN as an opportunity for greater stability and development, evidenced by four major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and Global Governance Initiative (GGI). The GDI and GSI are cornerstones, promoting win-win cooperation and a common security approach.
ASEAN countries have uniformly endorsed the GDI, with all joining the Group of Friends of the GDI at the UN, aligning with their development needs. The GSI has explicit support from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Timor-Leste, but not ASEAN as a whole; Malaysia has indicated willingness to consult on joining. In August 2026, Indonesia and China agreed to strengthen military exercises, defense industrial cooperation, and technology cooperation.
ASEAN has not abandoned its commitment to autonomy. In March 2025, it established the ASEAN Geoeconomic Task Force (AGTF) in response to the second Trump administration, later reorganized into the ASEAN Geoeconomic Group (AGG) in March 2026 to address geoeconomic competition. For ASEAN, expanding cooperative relationships with third partners beyond the US and China is increasingly critical.
Japan should recognize these needs and play a role as that third partner. Potential areas for cooperation include energy security, environment and green transformation, digital infrastructure including AI and semiconductors, infrastructure development, and security cooperation through defense equipment transfers and capacity-building. The Updated FOIP announced in May 2026 signals Japan's intention to reinforce issues important to ASEAN. Japan can utilize schemes such as the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC), Partnership on Wide Energy and Resources Resilience Asia (POWERR Asia), Official Security Assistance (OSA), and an ODA framework leveraging private-sector financing.
RCEP, the mega-FTA encompassing Japan, ASEAN, and other partners, is due for review in 2027. Japan and ASEAN should work together to maintain a freer and more open rules-based regional economic order. Supporting ASEAN's role in broader global forums and upholding a rules-based international order will become increasingly important.
The annual survey "The State of Southeast Asia" by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute consistently shows Japan commands the highest trust among extra-regional countries from ASEAN nations. According to the 2026 edition, the top reason for trusting Japan was "Japan is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law" (41.4%), followed by "Japan has vast economic resources and the political will to provide global leadership" (22.7%). Japan's reputation as a supporter of the rules-based international order may be its most valuable asset in working with ASEAN.
